THE FEDERALIST PAPERS by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. FEDERALIST No. 1 General Introduction For the Independent Journal. Saturday, October 27, 1787 HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: AFTER an unequivocal experience of the ineffica cy of the subsisting federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of th e parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether socie ties of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with prop riety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind. This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little favor able to the discovery of truth. Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices they hold under the State establishments; and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation fr om the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies than from its union under one government. It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature. I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because their situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious views. Candor will oblige us to admit that even such men may be actuated by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted that much of the opposition which has made its appeara nce, or may hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not respectable--the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes which serve to give a false bias to the judgm ent, that we, upon many occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right side of questions of the first magnitude to society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to those who are ever so much persuaded of their being i n the right in any controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this respect, might be drawn from the reflection that we are not always sure that those who advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party op position, and many other motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate as well upon those who support as those who oppose the right side of a question. Were there not even these inducements to moderation, nothing could be more ill-judged than that intolerant spirit w hich has, at all times, characterized political parties. For in politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution. And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we have already s ufficient indications that it will happen in this as in all former cases of great national discussion. A torrent of angry and malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude that they will mutually hope to evince the justn ess of their opinions, and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of their declamations and the bitterness of their invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be stigmatized as the offspring of a temper fond of despotic power an d hostile to the principles of liberty. An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people, which is more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will be represented as mere pretense and artifice, the stale bait for popularity at the expense of the public good. It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is the usual concomitant of love, and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten that the vigor of government is essential to the se curity of liberty; that, in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed judgment, their interest can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people than under the forbidden appearance of zeal for th e firmness and efficiency of government. History will teach us that the former has been found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism than the latter, and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun the ir career by paying an obsequious court to the people; commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants. In the course of the preceding obse rvatio ns, I have had an eye, my fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts, from whatever quarter, to influenc e your decision in a matter of the utmost moment to your welfare, by any impressions other than those which may result from the evide nce of truth. Y ou will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the general scope of them, that they proceed from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I own to you that, after having given it an attentive consideration, I am cle arly of opi nion i t is your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves which I do not feel. I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I hav e decid ed. I frank ly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded. The consciou sness of good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not, however, multiply professions on this head. My m otives must remain in the depository of my own breast. My arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit wh ich will not disgrace the cause of truth. I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interestin g particulars: THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR POLITICAL PRO SPERITY THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO PRESERVE THAT UNION T HE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED, TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT THE CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSE D CONSTITUTION TO THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR OWN STATE CONSTITUTION and lastly, THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY WHICH ITS ADOPTIO N WILL AFFO RD TO THE PRESERVATION OF THAT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT, TO LIBERTY, AND TO PROPERTY. In the progress of this discussi on I shall endeavor to give a satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made t heir appeara nce, that may seem to have a ny cl aim to your attention. It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the u tility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts of the great body of the people in every State , and one, which it may b e i magined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we already hear it whispered in the private ci rcles of those who oppose the new Constitution, that the thirteen States are of too great extent for any g eneral syst em, and that we m ust of necessity resort to separate confederacies of distinct portions of the whole.(1) This do ctrine will, in all probability, be gradually propagated, till it has votaries e nough to countenance an open avowal of it. For no thing c an be more evident, to those who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject, than the alternative of an adoption of the new Constitution or a dismemberme nt of the Union . It will therefore be of use to be gin by examin ing the advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the probable dangers, to which e very State will be exposed from its dissolution. This shall according ly constitute the subject of my next add ress. PUBLIUS 1. The same idea, trac ing the arguments to their consequences, is held out in several of the late publications agains t the new Constitution. FEDERALIST No. 2 Concerning Dangers fr om Foreign Force and Influe n ce For th e Independent Journal. Wednesday , Octobe r 31, 1787 JAY To the People of the State of New York: WHEN the people of America ref lect that they are now called upon to decide a question, which, i n its consequences, must p rov e one of the most i mportant t hat ever engaged their attention, the propriety of their taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very serious, view of it, will be evident. Nothing is mo re certain than the indispensable necessity of government, and it is equa lly undeniable, that whenever and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights in order to vest it with requis ite powers. It is well worthy of consideration therefore, whether it would conduce more to the interest of the people of America that they sh ould, to all general purposes, be one nation, under one fede ral gover nm ent, or tha t they should divid e themselves into separate confederacies, and give to the head of each t he same kind of powers which they are advised to place in one national g overnme nt. It has un til lately bee n a r eceived and uncontradicted opinion that the prosperity of the people o f America depended on their continuing firmly united, an d the wis hes, prayers, and effo rts of our be st a nd wisest citizens have been constantly directed to that object. But politicians now appear, who insist that this opinion is e rroneous, and t hat instead o f looking fo r sa fety and happiness in union, we ought to seek it in a division of the States into distinct confederacies or sovereignties . Howev er extrao rdinary this new s who were much opposed to it formerly, are at prese nt of th e number. Whatever may be the arguments or induce hese gentlemen, it certainly would not be wise in th e peop le at large to adopt these new political tenets without bein given me pleasure to observe that independent A merica was not composed of detached and distant territories, but stern sons of liberty. Providence has in a particu lar man ner blessed it with a vari ety of soils and prod uctio ion of its inhabitants. A succession of navigable waters f orms a kind of c hain round its bor ning at convenient distances, present them with highways for the eas y com m unic ir various commodities. With equal pleasure I ha ve as often taken notic e tha ne united people--a people descended from the s ame ancestors, speaking the s a nciples of government, very similar in their manner s and customs, and who, by thei r j long and bloody war, have nobly established genera l liberty and independence. Th is nd it appears as if it was the design of Providence, tha t an inheritance so proper and co nv st ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereigntie s. Simi minations of men among us. To all general purposes we have uniformly been one people each in dividua and protection. As a nation we have made peace and w ar; as a nation we have vanquished our common ene d entered into various compacts and conventions with foreign states. A strong sense of the value and blessi e a federal government to preserve and perpetuate it. They formed it almost as soon as they had a political e hen many of their citizens were bleeding, and when t he progress of hostility and desolation left little room fo ver precede the formation of a wise and well-balance d government for a free people. It is not to be wondered ld on experiment be found greatly deficient and inad equate to the purpose it was intended to answer. This in ontinuing no less attached to union than enamored o f liberty, they ob served the danger which immediately hat ample security for both could only be found in a n ational government more wisely fram ect under consideration. This convention composed o f m en who possessed nd wisdom, in times which tried the minds and heart s of men, und ertook the arduous tas ool, uninterrupted, and daily consultation; and final ly , without having been awed by power, or influ to the people the plan produced by their joint and ve ry una nimous councils. Admit, for so is the fac at it is neither recommended to BLIND approbati o n, nor to BLIND reprobation; but to that sed h it certainly ought to receive. But this (as was re marked in the foregoing number of this paper) i on teaches us not to be too sanguine in such h op es. It is not yet forgotten that well-grounded appreh mmended certain measures to their constitue nts , and the event proved their wisdom; yet it is fresh in ou measures. Not only many of the officers of g overnment, who obeyed the dictates of personal interest, but nts, or whose ambition aimed at objects whi ch did not correspond with the public good, were indefatigabl c Congress. Many, indeed, were deceived a nd deluded, b ut the gr eat majority of the people reason considered that the Congress was compose d of many wise a nd experienced men. That, bein em and communicated to each other a varie ty of us eful information. That, in the course of t true interests of their country, they must ha ve acq uir ed very accurate knowledge on that h and prosperity, and therefore that it was not less t heir inclination than their duty to recom n, they really thought prudent and advisable. T hese and similar considerations then induc e Congress; and they took their advice, notwith stand ing the various arts and endeavors used to e in the men of that Congress, few of whom ha d been fully tried or generally known, still greater reason ha or it is well known that some of the most distin guished members of that Congress, who have been since tri wn old in acquiring political information, were a lso members of this convention, and carried into it their accu nly the first, but every succeeding Congress, as well as the late convention, have invariably joined with the p Union. To preserve and perpetuate it was the gre at object of the people in forming that convention, and it is als m to adopt. With what propriety, therefore, or for w hat good purposes, are attempts at this particular period mad uggested that three or four confederacies would be better than one? I am persuaded in my own mind that the peo rm attachment to the cause of the Union rests on grea t and weighty reasons, which I shall endeavor to develop an ber of distinct confederacies in the room of the plan of t he convention, seem clearly to foresee that the rejection of ly would be the case, and I sincerely wish that it may be as clearly foreseen by every good citizen, that whene ver the dissolu tion of the Union arrives, America will have reason to exclaim, i n the words of the poet: "FAREWELL! A LONG FAREWELL TO ALL MY GREATNESS." PUBLIUS FEDER ALIST No . 3 The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From F oreign Force and Influence) For the Independent Journal. Saturday, November 3, 1787 JAY To the People of the S tate of New York: IT IS not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like the Americans, intelligent and wellinformed) seldom adopt and steadily persevere for many yea rs in an erroneous opinion respecting their interests. That conside ration naturally tends to create great respect for the high opinion which the pe ople of America have so long a nd uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing fir mly united under one federal government, vested with sufficient powers for a ll general an d nati onal pu rp o ses. The more attentively I consider and investigate the reason s which appear to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become convin ced that they are coge nt a nd conclusive. Among the many objects to which a wise and fr ee people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for thei r SAFETY see ms to be t he first. The SAFET Y of the people doubtless has relation to a great variety of circums tances and considerations, and consequently affords great latitude to thos e who wish to de fine it precisely and comprehensively. At present I m ean only to consider it as it respects security for the preservatio n of peace and tranquillity, as well as against dangers from FOREIGN ARM S AND INFLUE NC E, as fro m dange rs of the LIKE KIND arising from domestic causes. As the former of these comes first in order, it is proper it should be the first discussed. L et us therefore pr oceed to examin e whether the people are not right in their opinion that a cordial Un ion, under an efficient national government, affords them the best securit y that can be d evi sed agai nst HOSTILITIES fr om abroad. The number of wars which have happened or will ha ppen in the world will always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of th e c auses, wh ether R EAL or PRETENDED, which PROVOKE or INVITE them. If this rem ark be just, it becomes useful to inquire whether so many JUST causes o f war are likely t o b e given by UNIT ED AMERICA as by DISUNITED America; for if it should turn out that United America will probably give the fewest, then it will follow that in th is respect the Un ion tends mos t to preserve the people in a state of peace with other nations. The JU ST causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violation of treatie s or from direct vi olen ce. Ame rica h as already formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations, a nd all of them, except Prussia, are maritime, and therefore able to anno y and injure us. Sh e ha s also e xtensi ve commerce with Portugal, Spain, and Britain, and, with respect t o the two latter, has, in addition, the circumstance of neighborhood to attend to. It is of hig h im portance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfe ctly and punctually d one by one n ational government than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by three or four distinct confederacies. Because when once an efficie nt national governme nt is establishe d , th e best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also wi ll generally be appointed to manage it; for, although town or country, or other contracted inf luen ce, may plac e m en in State assemblies, or senates, or courts of justice, or executive departments, yet more general and extensive reputation for talents a nd other qualifications will b e necessary t o rec ommend men to offices under the national government,--especiall y as it will have the widest field for choice, and never experience tha t want of proper persons whi ch is not unco mmon in some of the States. Hence, it will result that the administration, the political counsels, and the judicial decisions of the national gov ernment will be more wise , sy stematical, and ju d icious than those of individual States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as well as more SAFE with respect to us. Because, under the nat io nal government, treat ies and articles of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expou nded in one sense and executed in the same manner,--whereas, ad judications on the same poin ts and questions, in thirtee n States, or in three or f our confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and that, as well from the variety of independent courts and judge s appointed by different and in dependent governments, as from th e different local laws and intere sts which may affect and influence them. The wisdom of t he convention, in committing such questions to the jurisdiction a nd judgment of courts appointe d by and responsible only to one national government, cannot be too much com mended. Because the prospect of present loss or advant age may often tempt the governing party in one or two States to s werve from good faith and justice; b ut those temptations, not reaching the other States, and consequently having little or no influence on the national government, the temptat ion will be fruitless, and good faith and justice be preserved. The case of the treaty of peace with Bri tain add s great weight to this reasoning. Because, even if the governing party in a S tate should be disposed to resist such temptations, ye t as such temptations may, and commonly do, result from circu mstances peculiar to the State, and m ay af fect a great number of the inhabitants, the g overning party may not alwa ys be able, if willing, to prevent the injustice meditate d, or to punish the aggressors. But the national government, no t being affected by those local circums tance s, will neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves, nor w ant power or inclination to prevent or punish its co mmission by others. So far, therefore, as either designed or ac cidental violations of treaties and the law s of n ations afford JUST c auses of war, they are less to be apprehended under one general government th an under several lesser ones, and in that respect the former m ost favors the SAFETY of the people. As to those just causes of war which proceed from d irect and unlawful violence, it a ppears equally clear to me that one good nationa l government affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort than can be derived from any other quarte r. Because such violences are mo re frequently caused by the pass ions and interests of a part than of the whole; o f one or two States than of the Union. Not a single Indian wa r has yet been occasioned by aggressions of th e prese nt federal govern ment, feebl e as it is; but there are several ins tances of Indian hostilities having been provo ked by the improper conduct of individual States, who, eith er unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offens es, have giv en o ccasion to the slaughter of many innocent inh abitants. The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on some States and not on ot hers, naturally confines the causes of quarrel more i mmediate ly to th e borderers. The bordering States, if any, will be those who, under the impulse of sudden irri tation, and a quick sense of apparent interest or injury, w ill be most likely, by direct violence, to excite war with these nati ons; a nd n o thing c an so effectually obviate that dan ger as a national government, whose wisdom and prudence will not be diminished by the passions w hich actuate the parties immediately interested. But not o nly fewer ju st cause s of wa r wil l be given by the national government, bu t it will also be more in their power to accomm odate and settle them amicably. They will be more tem perate and cool, and in that respect, as well as in others, wil l be more in capacity to act advisedly tha t in the offending State. The pride of states, as well as of men, naturally disposes them to justify all their actions, and opposes their acknowledging, c orrecting, or repairing their errors and offenses. The national g overnment, in such cases, wil l not be affected by this pride, but will proceed with moderation and candor to consider and deci de on the means most proper to extricate them from the difficulties which threaten them. Besides, it is well known that acknowledgm ents, explan ations, and co mpensations are of ten accepted as satisfactory from a strong united n ation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if off ered by a State or confederacy of little consideration or power. In t he year 1685, th e state of G enoa h aving offended Louis XIV., end eavored to appease him. He demanded that they sho uld send their Doge, or chief magistrate, accompanied b y four of their senators, to FRANCE, to ask his pardon and receive his terms. They w ere ob liged to submit to it f or the sake of peace. W ould he on any occasion either have demanded or hav e received the like humiliation from Spain, or Britain, or a ny other POWERFUL nation? PUBLIUS FEDERALIST No. 4 The Sa me Subject Continu ed (Concerni ng Dangers Fr om Foreign Force and Influence) For the Independent Jo urnal. Wednesday, November 7, 1787 JAY To the People of the State of New York: MY LAST paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the p eople would be best se cured by union against the danger it may be exposed to by JUST c auses of war given to other nations; and those reasons show that such causes would not only be more rarely given, but would also be more easily ac c ommodat ed, by a nat ional government than either by the State governments or th e proposed little confederacies. But the safety of the people of America against dangers from FOREIGN force depends not only o n their forbearing to g iv e JUST ca use s o f wa r to other nations, but also on their placing and continuing the mselves in such a situation as not to INVITE hostility or insult; for it need not be observed that there are PRETENDED as well as jus t causes of war. It is t oo true, ho w ever disgrac eful it may be to human nature, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it; nay, absol ute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get no thing by it, but for th e p urpo ses and objects me rely personal, such as thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affr onts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their par ticular families or partisans. These and a variety of other motives, which affect only th e min d of t he s over eign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of his people. But, independent of these inducements to war, which are more prevalent in absolute monarchies, but wh ich well deserve ou r at tentio n, the re are others which affect nations as often as kings; and some of them will on examination be found to grow out of our relative situation and circu mstances. With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheri es, and can suppl y the ir mar kets c heape r than they can themselves, notwithstanding any efforts to prevent it by bo unties on their own or duties on foreign fish. With them and with most other E uropean nations we are rivals in navigation and the carrying trad e; and we shall d eceive ourselves if we suppo se that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish; for, as our carrying trade can not increase without in some degree diminishing theirs, it is more their interest, a nd will be more their policy, to restrain than to promote it. In the trade to China and India, we in terfere with more than one nation, inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advan tages which they had in a manner monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves with commodities which we used to purchase from them. The extension of o ur own commerce in our own vessels cannot give pleasure to any nations who possess terr itories on or near this continent, because the cheapness and excellence of our producti ons, added to the circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and address of our m erchants and navigators, will give us a greater share in the advantages which those terr itories afford, than consists with the wishes or policy of their respective sovereigns. Spain t hinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on th e one side, an d Britai n excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the other; nor will either of them permit the other waters which are between them and us to become the means of mutual intercourse and traffic. From these and such like considerations, which might, if consistent with p rudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy to see that jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the minds and cabinets of other nations, and that we are not to expect that they s hould regard our advancement in union, in power and consequen ce by land and by sea, with an eye of indifference and composure. The people of America are aware that inducements to war may arise out of these circumstances, as well as from others not so obvious at p resent, and that whenever such inducements may find fit time and opportunity for operation, pretenses to color and justify them will not be wanting. Wisely, theref ore, do they consider union and a good national government as necessary to put and keep them in SUCH A SITU ATION as, instead of INVITING war, will tend to repress and discourage it. That situation consists in the best possible state of defense, and necessarily depends on the government, the arms, and the resources of the country. As the safety of the whole is the interest of the w hole, and cannot be provided for without government, either one or more or many, let us inquire whether one good gover nment is not, relative to the object in question, more competent than any other given number whatever. One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may be found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize, assimilate, and protect the several parts and members, and extend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. In the formation of treaties, it will regard the interest of the whole, and the particular interests of the parts as connected with that of the w hole. It can apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State governments or separate confederacies can possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system. It can place the militia under one plan of discipline, and, by putting their officers in a proper line of subordination to the Chief Magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate them into one corps, and thereby render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into three or four distinct independent companies. What would the militia of Britain be if the English militia obeyed the government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the government of Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the government of Wales? Suppose an invasion; would those three governments (if they agreed at all) be able, with all their respective forces, to operate against the enemy so effectually as the single government of Great Britain would? We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the time may come, if we are wise, when the fleets of America may engage attention. But if one national governm ent, had not so regulated the navigation of Britain as to make it a nursery for seamen--if one national government had not called forth all the national means and materials for forming fleets, their prowess and their thunder would never have been celebrated. Let England have its navi gation and fleet--let Scotland have its navigation and fleet--let Wales have its navigation and fleet--let Ireland have its navigation and fleet--let those four of the constituent parts of the British empire be be under four independent governments, and it is easy to perceive how soon the y would each dwindle into comparative insignificance. Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America divided into thirteen or, if you please, into three or four independent governments--what armies could they raise and pay--what fleets could they ever hope to have? If one was a ttacked, would the others fly to its succor, and spend their blood and money in its defense? Would there be no danger of their being flattered into neutrality by its specious promises, or seduced by a too great fondness for peace to decline hazarding their tranquillity and present saf ety for the sake of neighbors, of whom perhaps they have been jealous, and whose importance they are content to see diminished? Although such conduct would not be wise, it would, nevertheless, be natural. The history of the states of Greece, and of other countries, abounds wit h such instances, and it is not improbable that what has so often happened would, under similar circumstances, happen again. But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State or confederacy. How, and when, and in what proportion shall aids of men and money be affo rded? Who shall command the allied armies, and from which of them shall he receive his orders? Who shall settle the terms of peace, and in case of disputes what umpire shall decide between them and compel acquiescence? Various difficulties and inconveniences would be insep arable from such a situation; whereas one government, watching over the general and common interests, and combining and directing the powers and resources of the whole, would be free from all these embarrassments, and conduce far more to the safety of the people. But whate ver may be our situation, whether firmly united under one national government, or split into a number of confederacies, certain it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as it is; and they will act toward us accordingly. If they see that our national government is efficient and well administered, our trade prudently regulated, our militia properly organized and disciplined, our resources and finances discreetly managed, our credit re-established, our people free, contented, and united, they will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than pr ovoke our resentment. If, on the other hand, they find us either destitute of an effectual government (each State doing right or wrong, as to its rulers may seem convenient), or split into three or four independent and probably discordant republics or confederacies, one inclining to B ritain, another to France, and a third to Spain, and perhaps played off against each other by the three, what a poor, pitiful figure will America make in their eyes! How liable would she become not only to their contempt but to their outrage, and how soon would dear-bought experienc e proclaim that when a people or family so divide, it never fails to be against themselves. PUBLIUS FEDERALIST No. 5 The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) For the Independent Journal. Saturday, November 10, 1787 JAY To the Peop le of the State of New York: QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the UNION then forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I shall present the public with one or two extract s from it: "An entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace: It will secure your religion, liberty, and property; remove the animosities amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and differences betwixt our two kingdoms. It must increase your strength, riches, an d the dissolu tion of the Union arrives, America will have reason to exclaim, i n the words of the poet: "FAREWELL! A LONG FAREWELL TO ALL MY GREATNESS." PUBLIUS FEDER ALIST No . 3 The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From F oreign Force and Influence) For the Independent Journal. Saturday, November 3, 1787 JAY To the People of the S tate of New York: IT IS not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like the Americans, intelligent and wellinformed) seldom adopt and steadily persevere for many yea rs in an erroneous opinion respecting their interests. That conside ration naturally tends to create great respect for the high opinion which the pe ople of America have so long a nd uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing fir mly united under one federal government, vested with sufficient powers for a ll general an d nati onal pu rp o ses. The more attentively I consider and investigate the reason s which appear to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become convin ced that they are coge nt a nd conclusive. Among the many objects to which a wise and fr ee people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for thei r SAFETY see ms to be t he first. The SAFET Y of the people doubtless has relation to a great variety of circums tances and considerations, and consequently affords great latitude to thos e who wish to de fine it precisely and comprehensively. At present I m ean only to consider it as it respects security for the preservatio n of peace and tranquillity, as well as against dangers from FOREIGN ARM S AND INFLUE NC E, as fro m dange rs of the LIKE KIND arising from domestic causes. As the former of these comes first in order, it is proper it should be the first discussed. L et us therefore pr oceed to examin e whether the people are not right in their opinion that a cordial Un ion, under an efficient national government, affords them the best securit y that can be d evi sed agai nst HOSTILITIES fr om abroad. The number of wars which have happened or will ha ppen in the world will always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of th e c auses, wh ether R EAL or PRETENDED, which PROVOKE or INVITE them. If this rem ark be just, it becomes useful to inquire whether so many JUST causes o f war are likely t o b e given by UNIT ED AMERICA as by DISUNITED America; for if it should turn out that United America will probably give the fewest, then it will follow that in th is respect the Un ion tends mos t to preserve the people in a state of peace with other nations. The JU ST causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violation of treatie s or from direct vi olen ce. Ame rica h as already formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations, a nd all of them, except Prussia, are maritime, and therefore able to anno y and injure us. Sh e ha s also e xtensi ve commerce with Portugal, Spain, and Britain, and, with respect t o the two latter, has, in addition, the circumstance of neighborhood to attend to. It is of hig h im portance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfe ctly and punctually d one by one n ational government than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by three or four distinct confederacies. Because when once an efficie nt national governme nt is establishe d , th e best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also wi ll generally be appointed to manage it; for, although town or country, or other contracted inf luen ce, may plac e m en in State assemblies, or senates, or courts of justice, or executive departments, yet more general and extensive reputation for talents a nd other qualifications will b e necessary t o rec ommend men to offices under the national government,--especiall y as it will have the widest field for choice, and never experience tha t want of proper persons whi ch is not unco mmon in some of the States. Hence, it will result that the administration, the political counsels, and the judicial decisions of the national gov ernment will be more wise , sy stematical, and ju d icious than those of individual States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as well as more SAFE with respect to us. Because, under the nat io nal government, treat ies and articles of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expou nded in one sense and executed in the same manner,--whereas, ad judications on the same poin ts and questions, in thirtee n States, or in three or f our confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and that, as well from the variety of independent courts and judge s appointed by different and in dependent governments, as from th e different local laws and intere sts which may affect and influence them. The wisdom of t he convention, in committing such questions to the jurisdiction a nd judgment of courts appointe d by and responsible only to one national government, cannot be too much com mended. Because the prospect of present loss or advant age may often tempt the governing party in one or two States to s werve from good faith and justice; b ut those temptations, not reaching the other States, and consequently having little or no influence on the national government, the temptat ion will be fruitless, and good faith and justice be preserved. The case of the treaty of peace with Bri tain add s great weight to this reasoning. Because, even if the governing party in a S tate should be disposed to resist such temptations, ye t as such temptations may, and commonly do, result from circu mstances peculiar to the State, and m ay af fect a great number of the inhabitants, the g overning party may not alwa ys be able, if willing, to prevent the injustice meditate d, or to punish the aggressors. But the national government, no t being affected by those local circums tance s, will neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves, nor w ant power or inclination to prevent or punish its co mmission by others. So far, therefore, as either designed or ac cidental violations of treaties and the law s of n ations afford JUST c auses of war, they are less to be apprehended under one general government th an under several lesser ones, and in that respect the former m ost favors the SAFETY of the people. As to those just causes of war which proceed from d irect and unlawful violence, it a ppears equally clear to me that one good nationa l government affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort than can be derived from any other quarte r. Because such violences are mo re frequently caused by the pass ions and interests of a part than of the whole; o f one or two States than of the Union. Not a single Indian wa r has yet been occasioned by aggressions of th e prese nt federal govern ment, feebl e as it is; but there are several ins tances of Indian hostilities having been provo ked by the improper conduct of individual States, who, eith er unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offens es, have giv en o ccasion to the slaughter of many innocent inh abitants. The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on some States and not on ot hers, naturally confines the causes of quarrel more i mmediate ly to th e borderers. The bordering States, if any, will be those who, under the impulse of sudden irri tation, and a quick sense of apparent interest or injury, w ill be most likely, by direct violence, to excite war with these nati ons; a nd n o thing c an so effectually obviate that dan ger as a national government, whose wisdom and prudence will not be diminished by the passions w hich actuate the parties immediately interested. But not o nly fewer ju st cause s of wa r wil l be given by the national government, bu t it will also be more in their power to accomm odate and settle them amicably. They will be more tem perate and cool, and in that respect, as well as in others, wil l be more in capacity to act advisedly tha t in the offending State. The pride of states, as well as of men, naturally disposes them to justify all their actions, and opposes their acknowledging, c orrecting, or repairing their errors and offenses. The national g overnment, in such cases, wil l not be affected by this pride, but will proceed with moderation and candor to consider and deci de on the means most proper to extricate them from the difficulties which threaten them. Besides, it is well known that acknowledgm ents, explan ations, and co mpensations are of ten accepted as satisfactory from a strong united n ation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if off ered by a State or confederacy of little consideration or power. In t he year 1685, th e state of G enoa h aving offended Louis XIV., end eavored to appease him. He demanded that they sho uld send their Doge, or chief magistrate, accompanied b y four of their senators, to FRANCE, to ask his pardon and receive his terms. They w ere ob liged to submit to it f or the sake of peace. W ould he on any occasion either have demanded or hav e received the like humiliation from Spain, or Britain, or a ny other POWERFUL nation? PUBLIUS FEDERALIST No. 4 The Sa me Subject Continu ed (Concerni ng Dangers Fr om Foreign Force and Influence) For the Independent Jo urnal. Wednesday, November 7, 1787 JAY To the People of the State of New York: MY LAST paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the p eople would be best se cured by union against the danger it may be exposed to by JUST c auses of war given to other nations; and those reasons show that such causes would not only be more rarely given, but would also be more easily ac c ommodat ed, by a nat ional government than either by the State governments or th e proposed little confederacies. But the safety of the people of America against dangers from FOREIGN force depends not only o n their forbearing to g iv e JUST ca use s o f wa r to other nations, but also on their placing and continuing the mselves in such a situation as not to INVITE hostility or insult; for it need not be observed that there are PRETENDED as well as jus t causes of war. It is t oo true, ho w ever disgrac eful it may be to human nature, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it; nay, absol ute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get no thing by it, but for th e p urpo ses and objects me rely personal, such as thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affr onts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their par ticular families or partisans. These and a variety of other motives, which affect only th e min d of t he s over eign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of his people. But, independent of these inducements to war, which are more prevalent in absolute monarchies, but wh ich well deserve ou r at tentio n, the re are others which affect nations as often as kings; and some of them will on examination be found to grow out of our relative situation and circu mstances. With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheri es, and can suppl y the ir mar kets c heape r than they can themselves, notwithstanding any efforts to prevent it by bo unties on their own or duties on foreign fish. With them and with most other E uropean nations we are rivals in navigation and the carrying trad e; and we shall d eceive ourselves if we suppo se that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish; for, as our carrying trade can not increase without in some degree diminishing theirs, it is more their interest, a nd will be more their policy, to restrain than to promote it. In the trade to China and India, we in terfere with more than one nation, inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advan tages which they had in a manner monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves with commodities which we used to purchase from them. The extension of o ur own commerce in our own vessels cannot give pleasure to any nations who possess terr itories on or near this continent, because the cheapness and excellence of our producti ons, added to the circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and address of our m erchants and navigators, will give us a greater share in the advantages which those terr itories afford, than consists with the wishes or policy of their respective sovereigns. Spain t hinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on th e one side, an d Britai n excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the other; nor will either of them permit the other waters which are between them and us to become the means of mutual intercourse and traffic. From these and such like considerations, which might, if consistent with p rudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy to see that jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the minds and cabinets of other nations, and that we are not to expect that they s hould regard our advancement in union, in power and consequen ce by land and by sea, with an eye of indifference and composure. The people of America are aware that inducements to war may arise out of these circumstances, as well as from others not so obvious at p resent, and that whenever such inducements may find fit time and opportunity for operation, pretenses to color and justify them will not be wanting. Wisely, theref ore, do they consider union and a good national government as necessary to put and keep them in SUCH A SITU ATION as, instead of INVITING war, will tend to repress and discourage it. That situation consists in the best possible state of defense, and necessarily depends on the government, the arms, and the resources of the country. As the safety of the whole is the interest of the w hole, and cannot be provided for without government, either one or more or many, let us inquire whether one good gover nment is not, relative to the object in question, more competent than any other given number whatever. One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may be found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize, assimilate, and protect the several parts and members, and extend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. In the formation of treaties, it will regard the interest of the whole, and the particular interests of the parts as connected with that of the w hole. It can apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State governments or separate confederacies can possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system. It can place the militia under one plan of discipline, and, by putting their officers in a proper line of subordination to the Chief Magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate them into one corps, and thereby render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into three or four distinct independent companies. What would the militia of Britain be if the English militia obeyed the government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the government of Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the government of Wales?