```
ses; the chances of life and death. 9. The COMMANDER stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence; (2) uprightness of mind; (3) self-respect, self- control, or "proper feeling;" (4) wisdom; (5) since rity or good faith. Here "wisdom" and "sincerity" are put before "humanity or benevolence," and the two military virtues of "courage" and "strictness" substituted for "uprightness of mind" and "self- respect, self-control, or 'proper feeling.""] 10. By METHOD AND DISCIPLINE are to be understood the marsh aling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure. 11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows the
but division between them."] 24. Attack him where the is unprepared, appear where you are not expected. S. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand. 25. These military devices, leading to victory are not expected. So, was about to take the field, in order that he might there elaborate his plan of campaign.] The general who was about to take the field, in order that he might there elaborate his plan of campaign.] The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose. [1] "Words on Wellington," by Sir. W. Fraser. ---- II. WAGING WAR [Ts`ao Kung has the note: "He who wishes to fight must first count the cost," which prepares us for the discovery that the subject of the chapter is not what we might expect from the title, but is primarily a consideration of ways and means.] 1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers, [The "sw
                                                                                                                                                                     hed. [The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with the next, though obviously intended to do so. The arrangeme mentators that an emendation may be necessary for the sense, and we get no help from them there. The Chinese words Sun Tz
                                                                                                                e people to be impoveris
                                                                                                                  occur to Chinese com
                                                                                     ome syst
                                                                                 hand, the pr
                                                                                                                                                             causes prices to go up; and high prices cause the people's substance to be drained away. [Wang Hsi says high prices
is too poor to do so? 111. On the other
                                                                                                                 oximity of an army
                                                                           ds it of an arm
                                                                                                                                                                ossed the frontier.] 12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by heavy exact
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                ons. 13, 14.
                                                                     the homes of the
                                                                                                          people will be stri
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        e people are not
                                                                                                           ted from our te
                                                           ority should value an
                                                                                                                                                                         government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, breast-plates and
                                                                                                     d be careful of bo
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           helmets, bows and arro
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   ws. spears and shields, protective
                                                                                                 ill amount to four
                                                                                                                                  -tenths of its
                                                                                                                                                                            total revenue. 15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the ene
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  my's provisions is equivalent to tw
                                                                                                                                                                                        from one's own store. [Because twenty cartloads will be consumed
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               in the process of transporting
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 one cartload to the front. A PICUL
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              must have their rewards. ITu Mu save
                                                                                        ee the advantage of beating the enem
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    wards, so that all your men may h
                                                                                       or more chariots have been taken, t
                                                                                                                                                                 hose should
 vith ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly tre
                                                                                                                                                      g the conquered fo
                                                                                                                                                  d to enforce."] 20. Th
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   whether the nation shall be in peace or in pe
                                                                          d: In the practical art of war, the best t
                                                                                                                                               hing of all is to take t
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               ure an army entire than to destroy it, to capture
                                                                                                                                            an army corps, acco
                                                                                                                                                                                                 rding to Ssu-ma Fa, consisted nominally of 12500 men; according to Ts`ao Kung, the equivalent of a regi
                                                                                                                                       ny contains from 5 to
                                                                     and 500, and the equivalent of a compa
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme
                                                                       breaking the enemy's resis tance wit
                                                                                                                                   hout fighting. [Here
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    rd, which implies not an attitude of defense, whereby or
                                                                          us the highest form of gener
                                                                             ems one after a
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 lan of attack against us, we must anticipate him by delive
                                                                               event the ju nction of th
                                                                                                                                                                           e enemy's forces; [Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun Tzu, in speaking of hostilities, alw
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               avs has in mind the numerous states or principalities into v
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      an probable that they would have been masters of the situation be
evoided. [Another sound piece of military theory
                                                                                                                                                                   1899, and refrained from dissipating their strength before Kimberley, Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it is more th
                                                                                  Had t
                                                                                               he Boers acted upo
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 hat the Chinese word, here translated as "mantlets", described. Ts'a
ore the British were ready seriously to oppose th
                                                                                             ] The preparation of m
                                                                                                                                                                  movable shelters.
                                                                                 em.
                                                                                                                                                                                                       y were to protect the heads of those who were assaulting the city walls at close qu
 Kung simply defines them as "large shields," bu
                                                                                           we get a better idea of the m from L
                                                                                                                                                              i Ch`uan, who says the
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   arters. This seems to suggest a sort of Roman TESTUDO, ready ma
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       Iters" we get a fairly clear description from several commentator
                                                                                           repelling attacks, but this is denie
                                                                                                                                                       covered over with raw hide
                                                                                      ur wheels, propelled from within,
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       of filling up the encircling moat with earth. Tu Mu adds that they
                                                                                    p of mounds over against the wa
                                                                                                                                                    lls will take three mon
                                                                                                                                                preceding not
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  15. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like
                                                                                   ortified turrets mentioned in the
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       The meaning is that the general, losing patience at the long delay, may make a pre
                                                                                                                                                                                                                     third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken. Such are the dis
                                                                                   ady.] with the result that o
                                                                                   es of the Japane
                                                                                                                                                                             se before Port Ar
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    thur, in the most recent siege which history has to record.] 6. Therefore
                                                                                   cities without lav
                                                                                                                                                                                                               throws their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field. [Chi
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               a Lin notes that he only overthrows the Government, but do
                                                                 s, wi
                                                                                    thout losing a ma
                                                                                                                                                                       umph will be complete. [Owing to the double meanings in the Ch
                                                               on no
                                                                                    t being blunted by u
                                                                                                                                 se, its keenness
                                                              Straigh
                                                                                    tway, without waiting f
                                                                                                                              r any further advan
                                                                                                                                                                        tage.] if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two. [Tu Mu ta
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              aying; and at first sight, indeed, it appears to violate a funda
                                                                                   ver, gives a clue to Sun Tzu
                                                           ng, howe
                                                         merous as
                                                                                     that of the enemy, it shoul
                                                                                                                               be split up into tw
                                                                                                                                                                      o division
                                                                                                                                                                                          s, one to meet the enemy in front, and one to fall upon his re
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               k, he may be crushed from behind; if to the rearward attack
                                                                                                                                                                                               e regular way, and the other for some special diversion.' Tu Mu does not understand that dividing one
                                                        t." This is w
                                                                                    hat is meant by saying that
                                                                                                                                  one part may be
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               's army is simply an irregular, just as concentrating it is th
                                                     od, and he is
                                                                                    too hasty in calling this a
                                                                                                                                 mistake."] 9. If eq
                                                                                                                                                                     ually match
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               s and attacked are equally matched in strength, only the ab
                                                                                    rior in numbers, we can av
                                                                                                                                  oid the enemy;
                                                                                                                                                                     The meaning
                                                 at the saying o
                                                                                   nly applies if the other fact
                                                                                                                                  ors are equal: a
                                                                                                                                                                     small difference
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               qual in every way, we can flee from him. 10. Hence, though
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State w
                                                                                   small force, in the end it m
                                                                                                                                  ust be captured
                                                                                  p indicates deficiency: if
                                                                                                                                 the general's abil
                                                                                                                                                                     ity is not perfect
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                re three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon h
                                                                                  nce or to retreat, being
                                                                                                                                                                    t that it cannot ob
                                                                                                                                                                                                            of his army from a distance. But the commentators understand just the reverse, and quote t
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               he saying of T`ai Kung: "A kingdom should not be governe
                                                                                  sage as being at home,
                                                                                                                                and trying to dire
                                                                                                                                                                    ct the movements
                                                                                                                              se it is true that, du
                                                                                 wrong orders.] 14. (2
                                                                                                                              ) By attempting to g
                                                                                                                                                                   overn an army in the
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          This causes restlessness in the soldier's minds. ITs
                                                                                 ary sphere and the
                                                                                                                            civil sphere are who
                                                                                                                                                                                                        handle an army in kid gloves." And Chang Yu says: "Humanity and justice are the principles
nd flexibility, on the other hand
                                                                                tarv räther than civi
                                                                                                                          I virtues to assimilate
                                                                                                                                                                     the governing of an army"--to that of a State, understood.] 15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without discri
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              mination, [That is, he is not careful to use the right man in th
                                                                          e man likes to show his courage in action, the covetou
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            d distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudal p
                                                                      e army, and flinging victory away. 17. Thus we may know
                                                                                                                                                                     that there are five essentials for victory: (1) He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight. [Chang Yu s
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           ays: If he can fight, he advances and takes the offensive; if he
cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the defensive. He will invariably conquer who knows
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          secret lies in an eye for locality, and in not letting the right mo
mate numbers correctly, as Li Ch`uan and others make out. Chang Yu expounds the saying mo
                                                                                                                                                                   re satisfactorily: "By applying the art of war, it is possible with a lesser force to defeat a greater, and vice versa. The
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       e will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprer
                                                                                                                                                                                                       (4) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.
ment slip. Thus Wu Tzu says: 'With a superior force, make for easy ground; with an inferior one,
                                                                                                                                                                 otes Wang Tzu as saying: "It is the sovereign's function to give broad instructions, but to decide on battle it is the
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       function of the general." It is needless to dilate on the military di
                                                                                                                                                           me government. Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his extraordinary success to the fact that he w
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    as not hampered by central authority.] 18. Hence the saying: If you
know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. [Li Ch`uan cites the case of Fu Ch
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   ien, prince of Ch`in, who in 383 A.D. marched with a vast army agair
at the Chin Emperor. When warned not to despise an enemy who could command the services of such men as Hsieh An and Huan Ch`ung, he boastfully replied: "I have the population of eight provinces at my back, inf
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                antry and horsemen to the number of one million; why, they could da
m up the Yangisze River itself by merely throwing their whips into the stream. What danger have I to fear?" Nevertheless, his forces were soon after disastrously routed at the Fei River, and he was obliged to beat a hasty
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               retreat.] If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb
 every battle. [Chang Yu said: "Knowing the enemy enables you to take the offensive, knowing yourself enables you to stand on the defensive." He adds: "Attack is the secret of defense; defense is the planning of an attack
 1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself. [That is, of co
                                                                                                                   against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive. [I retain the sense found in a similar passage in ss. 1-3, in spite of the fact that the commentators are all against me. The meaning
nth earth," which is a metaphor indicating the utmost secrecy and conceal
                                                                                                                           ntators.] Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves, on the other, a victory that is complete. 8. To see victory only when it is within the
Ts`ao Kung remarks, "the thing is to see the plant before it has germinated
                                                                                                                             " to foresee the event before the action has begun. Li Ch`uan alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when about to attack the vastly superior army of
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   Chao, which was strongly entrenched in the city of Ch'e
                                                                                                                             my, and shall meet again at dinner." The office's hardly took his words seriously, and gave a very dubious assent. But Han Hsin had already worke
  by, as he foresaw, he was able to capture the city and inflict a crushin
                                                                                                                             g defeat on his adversary."] 9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!" [True excellence
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     e being, as Tu Mu says: "To plan secretly, to move sur
                                                                                                                             at at last the day may be won without shedding a drop of blood." Sun Tzu reserves his approbation for things that "the world's coarse thumb And fin
                                                                                                                            which is finest in autumn, when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a very common one in Chines
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no
  gn of a quick ear. [Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength,
                                                                                                                          sharp sight and quick hearing: Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 stone; Li Chu, who at a dist
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       jects no bigger than a mustard seed; and Shih K'uang
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     uering, excels in easy conquering." Mei Yao-ch'en say
e. [Tu Mu explains this very well: "Inasmuch as his vic
                                                                                                                       11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease. The
   blind musician who could hear the footsteps of a mosquito.
                                                                                                              ulty; he who looks below the surface of things, wins with ease."] 12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputatio
   'He who only sees the obvious, wins his battles with diffic
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     ny bloodshed, he receives no credit for courage."] 13.
  ies are gained over circumstances that have not come t
                                                                                                           o light, the world as large knows nothing of them, and he wins no reputation for wisdom; inasmuch as the hostile state
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     submits before there has been a
                                                                                                       says: "He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no futile attacks." The connection of ideas is thus explained by C
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     quer by sheer strength, clever though he may be at wir
ning pitched battles, is also liable on occasion to be
                                                                                                                                                                       k into the future and discern conditions that are not yet manifest, will never m
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          iably win."] Making no mistakes is what
                                                                                                vanguished: whereas he who can loo
                                                                                                                                                                        eated. 14. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position which makes
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            iss the moment for defeating the enem
  stablishes the certainty of victory, for it means co
                                                                                        nquering an enemy that is already def
 . [A "counsel of perfection" as Tu Mu truly obs
                                                                                                                                                                         to the actual ground occupied by the troops. It includes all the arrangemen
                                                                                           "Position" need not be confined
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         ts and preparations which a wise general
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            will make to increase the safety of his
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           ounds the paradox: "In warfare, first la
                                                                                                                                                                      victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and a fterwards looks for victory. [Ho Shih thus exp
 plans which will ensure victory, and the
                                                                                                                                                      ill not begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory will no longer be a ssured."] 16. The consummate leader cultiv
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           ates the moral law, and strictly adheres
                                                                                     your army to battle; if you w
                                                                                                                                                n respect of military method, we have, firstly Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Ba
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            lancing of chances; fifthly, Victory. 18. Measurem
                                                                                          control success, 17, I
                                                                                                                                                  ; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances. [It is n
ent owes its existence to Earth: Estim ation of quantit
                                                                                          v to Measurement
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      ot easy to distinguish the four terms very clearly in the
                                                                                                                                                    nd, which enable us to form an estimate of the enemy's strength, and to make calculations based on the data thus obta
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     ined; we are thus led to a general weighing-up, or com
rison of the enemy's chances with our own; if the latte
                                                                                              r turn th
                                                                                                                       e scale, the
                                                                                                                                                     n victory ensues. The chief difficulty lies in third term, which in the Chinese some commentators take as a calculation
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    of NUMBERS, thereby making it nearly synonymous w
                                                                                                                 ght of as a con
                                                                                                                                                     sideration of the enemy's general position or condition, while the third term is the estimate of his numerical strength. On t
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    er hand, Tu Mu says: "The question of relative strength
                                                                                              hou
 aving been settled, we can bring the varied resources o
                                                                                                                                                      Ho Shih seconds this interpretation, but weakens it. However, it points to the third term as being a calculation of numbers.] 19. A vict
                                                                                                             cunning into play.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   orious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound's we
                                                                                                                                                    like an I (20 oz.) weighed against a SHU (1/24 oz.); a routed army is a SHU weighed against an I." The point is simply the enormous adv
  ht placed in the scale against a single grain. [Literally,
                                                                                                         a victorious army is
  s over one demoralized by defeat." Legge, in his note on
                                                                                                                                                  es the I to be 24 Chinese ounces, and corrects Chu Hsi's statement that it equaled 20 oz. only. But Li Ch'uan of the Tang dynasty here of
                                                                                                      Mencius, I. 2, ix, 2, mal
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   ives the same fi
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       gure as Chu Hsi.]
   Γhe onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of
                                                                                                    pent-up waters into a ch
                                                                                                                                                  asm a thousand fathoms deep. --- V. ENERGY 1. Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same principle as the control of a few
                                                                                                                                                 nies, etc., with subordinate officers in command of each. Tu Mu remi
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    nds us of Han Hsin's famous reply to the first Han Emp
on of dividing up their numbers. [That is, cutting up the ar
                                                                                                  my into regiments, compa
                                                                                                                                                 men, your Majesty." "And you?" asked the Emperor. "Oh!" he answere
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            d, "the more the better."] 2. Fighting with a large a
iid to him: "How large an army do you think I could lead?'
ommand is nowise different from fighting with a small one
                                                                                                                                               f instituting signs and signals. 3. To ensure that your whole host may with
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              stand the brunt of the enemy's attack and rema
                                                                                                 : it is merely a question o
                                                                                                one of the most interesting
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                t is by no means easy to grasp the full
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             significance of these two terms, or to render the
                                                                                                well to tabulate some of t
                                                                                                                                                                       entators' remarks on the subject before proceeding further. Li
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                Ch`uan: "Facing
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   he enemy is CHENG, making lateral diversion is CH'l. Ch
                                                                                                                                                                                         , but in order to secure victory abnormal maneuvers
                                                                                               raved in normal fashion
sivity means waiting for an opportunity, activity beings the
                                                                                                victory itself." Ho S
                                                                                                                                                                                           hih: "We must cause the enemy to regard our strain
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  one that is secretly designed, and vice versa; thus CHEN
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         st Lin- c
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    hin (now Chao-i in Shensi), suddenly threw a large force
across the Yellow River in wooden tubs, utterly disconcert
                                                                                                                                                                                            g his opponent. [Ch'ien Han Shu, ch. 3.] Here, we ar
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     as CHENG, and the surprise maneuver was CHI." Cha
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         e told, the marc
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     Lin-chin w
                                                                                                                                                                                            riters do not agree with regard to the meaning of CH
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       .C.I says: 'Direct warfare favors frontal attacks, indire
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       ver.' Li Wei-kung [6th and 7th cent. A.D.] says: 'In war
                                                                                                                                                                                          ing straight out to join battle is a direct operation; app earing on the e
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        nv's rear is an indirect maneu
                                                                                      ead is CHENG; turning movements, on the other hand, are CH`I.' These writers simply regard CHENG as CHENG, and ides of a circle [see infra, ss. 11]. A comment on the T`ang Emperor T`ai Tsung goes to the root of the matter: 'A CH`I maneuver he whole secret lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real intent.'" To put it perhaps a little more clearly: any attack
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  CH'l as CH'l; they do not note tha
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      t the two are mutually interchangeable and run into ea
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 may be CHENG, if we make the e
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    nemy look upon it as ĆHENG; then our real attack will be
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      nemy has had his attention fixed; whereas
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                or other operation is CHENG, on
                                                                             him by surprise or comes from an unexpected quarter. If the enemy perceives a movement which is meant to be CH'I," it immediately becomes
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                CHENG."] 4. That the impact of
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 vour army m
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           ay be like a grindstone dashed against
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              ect tactics, either by pounding the en
                                                        science of weak points and strong. 5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              ictory. [Chang Yu says:
emy's flanks or falling on his rear." A brilliant example of "ind
                                                                                              irect tactics" which decided the fortunes of a campaign was Lord Roberts' night march round the Peiwar Kotal in the second Afgh
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             an war. [1] 6. Indirect tactics,
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 are inexhausible as Heaven and Ear
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          efficiently applied,
                                                                                                                                               egin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more. [Tu Yu and Chang Yu u
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       tions of CH'I and CHEN
th, unending as the flow of rivers and streams: like the sun a
                                                                                                 nd moon, they end but to b
                                                                                                  Cheng Yu-hsien that a claus
                                                                                                                                                       e relating to it has fallen out of the text. Of course, as has already been pointed out, the
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             two are so inextricably inter
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     woven in all military oper
                                                                                                     figurative language, of the al
                                                                                                                                                           most infinite resource of a great leader.] 7. There are not more than five musical not
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            to more melodies than can
                                                                                                                                                                d black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever be en seen.
                                                                                                    ors (blue, yellow, red, white, an
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              There are not more than f
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 ive cardinal ta
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              s (sour, acrid, salt, sweet
                                                                                                     can ever be tasted, 10. In battle
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               ion give r
                                                                                                 ch other in turn. It is like moving in a c
                                                                                                                                                                         ircle - you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of the
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          eir combination? 12. The
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      of troo
                                                                                                                                                                             ell-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy it
                                                                                              e. 13. The quality of decision is like the w
                                                                                            f the translator. Tu Mu defines this word as "t
                                                                                                                                                                                he measurement or estimation of distance." But this mean
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        does not quite fit the illu
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    in ss. 15. Applying this
                                                                                        te that instinct of SELF RESTRAINT which keeps th
                                                                                                                                                                                   e bird from swooping on its quarry until the right momen
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        t, together with the pow
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         e. When the "Victory" we
                                                                                    he highly important one of being able to reserve their fi
                                                                                                                                                                                      re until the very instant at which it will be most effectiv
arrived. The analogous quality in soldiers is t
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   nt into action at Trafal
                                                                                  exposed to a storm of shot and shell before replying with
                                                                                                                                                                                        a single gun. Nelson coolly waited until he was within
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          oadside he brought to bear w
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         close range, when the br
                                                                                                                                                                                         decision. [The word "decision" would have reference t
                                                                              the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          o the measurement of dis-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    ance mentioned above, letting the en
                                                                          n Tzu meant to use the word in a figurative sense comparable to o
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              on's mode of attack, proceeds: "This is just how the 'psychological mo
                                                                       5. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to t
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       mile of energy and the force stored up in the bent cross- bow until released
                                                                      Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder a
                                                                y fixed, and the various signals agreed upon, the separating and joining, the
                                                                                                                                                                                           dispersing and collecting which will take place in the course of a battle, may give the appearance of disorder when no real disorder is possible. Your formation may be withou
                                                            ons all topsy-turvy, and yet a rout of your forces quite out of the question."] 17.
                                                                                                                                                                                           Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated fear postulates courage, simulated
                                                       he sharply paradoxical form of the original. Ts`ao Kung throws out a hint of the mean
                                                                                                                                                                                          ing in his brief note: "These things all serve to destroy formation and conceal one's condition." But Tu Mu is the first to put it quite plainly: "If you wish to feign confusion in o
der to lure the enemy on, you must first have perfect discipline; if you wish to display timidity in order to entrap the enemy, y ou must have extreme courage; if you wish to parade your weakness in order to make the enemy over-confident, you must have exceeding strength."] 18. Hiding order beneathed the cloak of disorder is simply a question of subdivision; [See supra, ss. 1.] concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; [The commentators strongly understand a certain Chinese word here differently than anywhere else in this chapter. Thus Tu Mu says: "seeing that
  to report on their condition. But the Hsiung-nu, forewarned, carefully concealed all their able-bodied men and well-fed horses, and only allowed infirm soldiers and emaciated cattle to be seen. The result was that spies one and all recommended the Emperor to deliver his attack. Lou Ching alone opposed
 report on their condition. But the Hsiung-nu, forewarned, carefully concealed all their able-bodied men and well-fed horses, and only allowed infirm soldiers and emaciated cattle to be seen. The result was that spies one and all recommended the Emperor to deliver his attack. Lou Ching alone opposed to them, saying: "When two countries go to war, they are naturally inclined to make an ostentatious display of their strength. Yet our spies have seen nothing but old age and to she we have seen nothing but old age and to she we have seen on the part of the enemy, on the enemy, on the part of the enemy, on the part of the enemy of the interport of the enemy of the e
wn into confusion. [The above is Tu Mu's version of the story; the SHIH CHI, less dramatically but probably with more historical truth, makes P ang Chuan cut his own throat with an exclamation of despair, after the rout of his army.] He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it. 20. By holding out the probably with more historical truth, makes P ang Chuan cut his own throat with an exclamation of despair, after the rout of his army.] He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it. 20. By holding out the probably with more historical truth, makes P ang Chuan cut his own throat with an exclamation of despair, after the rout of his army.] He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it. 20. By holding out the probably with more historical truth, makes P ang Chuan cut his own throat with an exclamation of despair, after the rout of his army.] He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it. 20. By holding out the rout of his army.] He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it. 20. By holding out the rout of his army.] He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it. 20. By holding out the rout of his army.] He sacrifices something, that the sacrifices is made in the sacrifices in an interest of his army.] He sacrifices is made in the sacrification of his army.] He sacrifices is made in the sacrification of his army.] He sacrifices is made in the sacrification of his army.] He s
  calls this "the use of natural or inherent power."] 23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the subject of energy. [The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu Mu's opinion, is the paramount import
 nce in war of rapid evolutions and sudden rushes. "Great results," he adds, "can thus be achieved with small forces."] [1] "Forty-one Years in India," chapter 46. ---- VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG [Chang Yu attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as follows: "Chapter IV, on Tactical Dispositions, to
  ated of the offensive and the defensive; chapter V, on Energy, dealt with direct and indirect methods. The good general acquaints himself first with the theory of attack and defense, and then turns his attention to direct and indirect methods. He studies the art of varying and combining these two methods because the control of the con
efore proceeding to the subject of weak and strong points. For the use of direct or indirect methods arises out of attack and defense, and the perception of weak and strong points. For the use of direct or indirect methods arises out of attack and defense, and the perception of weak and strong points.
said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive exhausted. 2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him. [One
econd, he will strike at some important point which the enemy will have to defend.] 4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; [This passage may be cited as evidence against Mei Yao- Ch'en's interpretation of I. ss. 23.] if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he can
orce him to move. 5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected. 6. An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through country where the enemy is not. [Ts`ao Kung sums up very well: "Emerge from the void [q.d. lik
"a bolt from the blue", strike at vulnerable points, shun places that are defended, attack in unexpected quarters." 7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended. [Wang Hsi explains "undefended places" as "weak points; that is to say, where the general is
lacking in capacity, or the soldiers in spirit; where the walls are not strong enough, or the defenders are variance amongst themselves."] You can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold positions that annot be attacked. [l.e., where there are none of the weak points mentioned above. There is rather a nice point involved in the interpretation of this later clause. Tu Mu, Ch`en Hao, and Mei Yao-ch`en assume the meaning to be: "In order to make your defense quite safe, you must defend EVEN those places to
hat are not likely to be attacked;" and Tu Mu adds: "How much more, then, those that will be attacked." Taken thus, however, the clause balances less well with the preceding--always a consideration in the highly antithetical style which is natural to the Chinese. Chang Yu, therefore, seems to come nearer the mark in saying: "He who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven [see IV. ss. 7], making it impossible for the enemy to guard against him. This being so, the places that I shall attack are precisely those that the enemy cannot defend.... He who is skilled in defense hides in the mo
st secret recesses of the earth, making it impossible for the enemy to estimate his whereabouts. This being so, the places that I shall hold are precisely those that the enemy cannot attack."] 8. Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack. [An aphorism which puts the whole art of war in a nutshell.] 9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you we learn to be invisible, through you made for the enemy's fate in our hands. 10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy. 11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement ev
we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands. 10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy's weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy. 11. If we wish to fight, the enemy is the invading party we can prevent he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve. [Tu Mu says: "If the enemy is the invading party, we can cut his line of communications as overeign himself." It is clear that Sun Tzu, unlike certain generals in the late Boer war, was no believer in frontal attacks.] 12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the line of countries. The late Boer war, was no believer in frontal attacks.] 12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy in the enemy is the enemy is the enemy is fate in the late Boer war, was no believer in frontal attacks.] 12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy in the enemy is the enemy is the enemy is may appear to the enemy in the late Boer war, was no believer in frontal attacks.] 12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy in the enemy is the enemy is fate in the late Boer war, was no believer in frontal attacks.] 12. If we do not wish to fight, must not be attacked. If we can prevent the enemy is the enemy is the enemy in the enemy is a property of the enemy is the enemy is the enemy will be a property of the enemy interior. If the enemy is the prevent the enemy will be a property of the enemy interior force with a superior one explained to fight must not be made known; for then the prevent will be a whole prevent will be a whole prevent of the prevent will be a prevent to the enemy will be a whole prevent of the prevent will be a whole prevent will be a whole prevent of the prevent will be a whole prevent will be a whole prevent of the prevent will be a whole prevent to the prevent of the enemy is the prevent will be a whole 
ew. 15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits. 16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points; [Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant's victories by saying that "while his opponents were kept fully employed wondering what he was going to do, HE was thinking most of what he was going to do, HE was thinking most of what he was going to do himself."] and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few. 17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his rear.
where be weak. [In Frederick the Great's INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS GENERALS we read: "A defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent detachment. Those generals who have had but little experience attempt to protect every point, while those who are better acquainted with their profession, having only
```